Arbeitspapier
On Liability Insurance for Automobiles
Car owners are liable for property damage inflicted on other motorists. In most countries such liability must be insured by law. That law may favor expensive or heavy vehicles, prone to suffer or inflict large losses. This paper explores links between liability rules and vehicle choice. It presumes cooperative insurance, but non-cooperative acquisition of vehicles. Thus, the Nash equilibrium and its degree of efficiency depend on the liability regime.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 321
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Noncooperative Games
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- Thema
-
liability
mutual insurance
core
pure Nash equilibrium
anonymous games
non-atomic measure
Kfz-Versicherung
Kraftfahrzeug
Entscheidung
Spieltheorie
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Flåm, Sjur Didrik
Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2010
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13233
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13233-3
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Flåm, Sjur Didrik
- Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2010
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Tort Liability and Settlement Failure: Evidence on Litigated Auto Insurance Claims
How much internalization of nuclear risk through liability insurance?
Quality change in Brazilian automobiles
Integrated asset liability modelling for property casuality insurance: A portfolio theoretical approach
Switching consumers and product liability: on the optimality of incomplete strict liability
Liability games
On the Shapley value of liability games
Limiting Limited Liability
On strike insurance
Intermediary liability and trade in follow-on innovation
Ambiguous Beliefs on Damages and Civil Liability Theories
Platform Liability and Innovation
Tort Liability and Settlement Failure: Evidence on Litigated Auto Insurance Claims
How much internalization of nuclear risk through liability insurance?
Quality change in Brazilian automobiles
Integrated asset liability modelling for property casuality insurance: A portfolio theoretical approach
Switching consumers and product liability: on the optimality of incomplete strict liability
Liability games
On the Shapley value of liability games
Limiting Limited Liability
On strike insurance
Intermediary liability and trade in follow-on innovation
Ambiguous Beliefs on Damages and Civil Liability Theories
Platform Liability and Innovation
Tort Liability and Settlement Failure: Evidence on Litigated Auto Insurance Claims
How much internalization of nuclear risk through liability insurance?
Quality change in Brazilian automobiles
Integrated asset liability modelling for property casuality insurance: A portfolio theoretical approach
Switching consumers and product liability: on the optimality of incomplete strict liability
Liability games
On the Shapley value of liability games
Limiting Limited Liability
On strike insurance
Intermediary liability and trade in follow-on innovation
Ambiguous Beliefs on Damages and Civil Liability Theories