Arbeitspapier

Crowding out and imitation behavior in the solidarity game

In the Solidarity Game (Selten and Ockenfels, 1998), two "rich" persons can support a "poor" one. A strong positive correlation between one rich person's solidarity contribution and his expected contribution of the other is observed. This paper investigates the causality behind this correlation. Depending on the measure, we find that up to thirds of our subjects behave strategically. More than one third of the subjects show a crowding-out effect, i.e. they want to give less if they expect others to give more. This is no contradiction to the positive correlation if these subjects assume the others to be like themselves. In addition to strategic motives we find, for a quarter of the subjects, the wish to imitate their co-benefactors, usually however only for low contributions.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 223

Classification
Wirtschaft
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Subject
Solidarity
Crowding out
Imitation
Solidarität
Spieltheorie
Altruismus
Crowding out
Konsuminterdependenz
Experiment
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Vogel, Claudia
Heimel, Jana
Bolle, Friedel
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
European University Viadrina, Department of Business Administration and Economics
(where)
Frankfurt (Oder)
(when)
2004

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Vogel, Claudia
  • Heimel, Jana
  • Bolle, Friedel
  • European University Viadrina, Department of Business Administration and Economics

Time of origin

  • 2004

Other Objects (12)