Arbeitspapier

Crowding out and imitation behavior in the solidarity game

In the Solidarity Game (Selten and Ockenfels, 1998), two "rich" persons can support a "poor" one. A strong positive correlation between one rich person's solidarity contribution and his expected contribution of the other is observed. This paper investigates the causality behind this correlation. Depending on the measure, we find that up to thirds of our subjects behave strategically. More than one third of the subjects show a crowding-out effect, i.e. they want to give less if they expect others to give more. This is no contradiction to the positive correlation if these subjects assume the others to be like themselves. In addition to strategic motives we find, for a quarter of the subjects, the wish to imitate their co-benefactors, usually however only for low contributions.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 223

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Thema
Solidarity
Crowding out
Imitation
Solidarität
Spieltheorie
Altruismus
Crowding out
Konsuminterdependenz
Experiment
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Vogel, Claudia
Heimel, Jana
Bolle, Friedel
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
European University Viadrina, Department of Business Administration and Economics
(wo)
Frankfurt (Oder)
(wann)
2004

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Vogel, Claudia
  • Heimel, Jana
  • Bolle, Friedel
  • European University Viadrina, Department of Business Administration and Economics

Entstanden

  • 2004

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