Arbeitspapier
Trade Protection in India: Economics vs. Politics?
This paper investigates economic and political determinants of protection across the secondary (manufacturing) sector. Economic factors can be summarized by the infant industry argument and we expect industries which are relatively efficient compared to the rest-of-the-world to have low levels of protection. Moreover, the degree of protection should change as the relative efficiency of an industry changes over time. Political factors reflect pressure group politics: relatively inefficient industries may enjoy a great deal of protection because of political lobbying.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1996-16
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
Planning Models; Planning Policy
- Thema
-
Effective Rate of Protection
Liberalization
Political Economy
Protection
Trade
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gang, Ira N.
Pandey, Mihir
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Rutgers University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
New Brunswick, NJ
- (wann)
-
1996
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gang, Ira N.
- Pandey, Mihir
- Rutgers University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 1996
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