Arbeitspapier
Revenue Motives and Trade Liberalization in an Endogenous Tariff Model
Governments in more developed economies partially compensate import-competing industries when world prices fall, i.e. they lean against the wind. In less developed economies we often observe liberalization in response to the same shock. We use a political-support maximization model with revenue motives to derive conditions under which a rational policy-maker would respond to lower world prices by reducing tariff protection for an import-competing industry. An initial tariff that exceeds the maximum revenue level proves necessary but not sufficient for politically optimal liberalization following a fall in the world price of the importable good.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1994-12
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- Thema
-
policy
protection
reform
tariffs
trade liberalization
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gang, Ira N.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Rutgers University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
New Brunswick, NJ
- (wann)
-
1994
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gang, Ira N.
- Rutgers University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 1994
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