Arbeitspapier

Private protection against crime when property value is private information

This paper analyzes private precautions against crime when the value of the property to be protected is private information. Within a framework in which potential criminals can choose between various crime opportunities, we establish that decentralized decision-making by potential victims may lead to suboptimal levels of investment in private protection. Specifically, suboptimal investment can occur when observable precautions communicate information about property value to potential offenders, even when the diversion effect of private safety measures is taken into account.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3888

Classification
Wirtschaft
Externalities
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Subject
Sicherheitsgewerbe
Kriminalitätsökonomik
Eigentum
Asymmetrische Information
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Baumann, Florian
Friehe, Tim
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2012

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Baumann, Florian
  • Friehe, Tim
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2012

Other Objects (12)