Arbeitspapier
Competitive pressure and corporate crime
This paper explores the relationship between the intensity of competition in product markets and firms' incentives to lower their production costs by illegal means. Our framework combines a Salop circle with a crime model à la Becker, allowing us to differentiate between several measures for the intensity of competition. We establish that more firms in the industry (i.e., lower entry costs) reduce the crime rate. Furthermore, whether more intense competition due to the increased substitutability of products raises or lowers the prevalence of criminal behavior can be clearly linked to the impact of such behavior on firms' production costs. Finally, we find that stricter law enforcement may entice more firms to enter the market, despite the higher expected sanction in the event of wrongdoing.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- ISBN
-
9783863041090
- Erschienen in
-
Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 110
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Criminal Law
Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Thema
-
product market competition
crime
deterrence
market entry
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Baumann, Florian
Friehe, Tim
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
- (wo)
-
Düsseldorf
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Baumann, Florian
- Friehe, Tim
- Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Entstanden
- 2013