Arbeitspapier
The impact of incentive pay on corporate crime
This paper presents a moral hazard model analyzing the agent's incentive to commit corporate crime. The principal can only observe profits which the agent can increase by committing crime or exerting effort. It is shown how different incentive contracts, i.e., thresholdlinear, capped bonus and linear contracts, can be adjusted in order to promote agent's law abiding behavior. Any adjustment implies a loss in internal efficiency which decreases in individual sanctions imposed on the agent.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 52-2017
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Regulation and Business Law: General
Antitrust Law
- Thema
-
moral hazard
incentive pay
corporate crime
cartels
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Herold, Daniel
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics
- (wo)
-
Marburg
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Herold, Daniel
- Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics
Entstanden
- 2017
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