Arbeitspapier
Private protection against crime when property value is private information
This paper analyzes private precautions against crime when the value of the property to be protected is private information. Within a framework in which potential criminals can choose between various crime opportunities, we establish that decentralized decision-making by potential victims may lead to suboptimal levels of investment in private protection. Specifically, suboptimal investment can occur when observable precautions communicate information about property value to potential offenders, even when the diversion effect of private safety measures is taken into account.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3888
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Externalities
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Thema
-
Sicherheitsgewerbe
Kriminalitätsökonomik
Eigentum
Asymmetrische Information
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Baumann, Florian
Friehe, Tim
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Baumann, Florian
- Friehe, Tim
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2012