Getting disabled workers back to work: How important are economic incentives?

Arbeitspapier

We investigate the impacts of economic incentives on the duration and outcome of temporary disability insurance (TDI) spells. The analysis is based on a large quasi-experiment in Norway, with a complete overhaul of the TDI benefit system. Our findings show that the labor supply of TDI claimants responds to both the benefit-level and to the level of local labor demand. The estimated elasticity of the employment hazard with respect to the benefit-level is - 0.3. We also find that the level of TDI benefits significantly affects the transition rate to alternative social insurance programs such as permanent disability and unemployment.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7137

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Social Security and Public Pensions ; Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs ; Time Allocation and Labor Supply
• Subject: temporary disability ; rehabilitation ; hazard rate models ; labor supply ; Erwerbsunfähigkeit ; Rehabilitation ; Berufliche Integration ; Lohnfortzahlung ; Reform ; Ökonomischer Anreiz ; Norwegen

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Fevang, Elisabeth ; Hardoy, Inés ; Røed, Knut
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/69360
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET