Arbeitspapier

Getting disabled workers back to work: How important are economic incentives?

We investigate the impacts of economic incentives on the duration and outcome of temporary disability insurance (TDI) spells. The analysis is based on a large quasi-experiment in Norway, with a complete overhaul of the TDI benefit system. Our findings show that the labor supply of TDI claimants responds to both the benefit-level and to the level of local labor demand. The estimated elasticity of the employment hazard with respect to the benefit-level is - 0.3. We also find that the level of TDI benefits significantly affects the transition rate to alternative social insurance programs such as permanent disability and unemployment.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7137

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Social Security and Public Pensions
Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Thema
temporary disability
rehabilitation
hazard rate models
labor supply
Erwerbsunfähigkeit
Rehabilitation
Berufliche Integration
Lohnfortzahlung
Reform
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Norwegen

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Fevang, Elisabeth
Hardoy, Inés
Røed, Knut
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Fevang, Elisabeth
  • Hardoy, Inés
  • Røed, Knut
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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