Arbeitspapier
Getting disabled workers back to work: How important are economic incentives?
We investigate the impacts of economic incentives on the duration and outcome of temporary disability insurance (TDI) spells. The analysis is based on a large quasi-experiment in Norway, with a complete overhaul of the TDI benefit system. Our findings show that the labor supply of TDI claimants responds to both the benefit-level and to the level of local labor demand. The estimated elasticity of the employment hazard with respect to the benefit-level is - 0.3. We also find that the level of TDI benefits significantly affects the transition rate to alternative social insurance programs such as permanent disability and unemployment.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7137
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Social Security and Public Pensions
Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
- Thema
-
temporary disability
rehabilitation
hazard rate models
labor supply
Erwerbsunfähigkeit
Rehabilitation
Berufliche Integration
Lohnfortzahlung
Reform
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Norwegen
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fevang, Elisabeth
Hardoy, Inés
Røed, Knut
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fevang, Elisabeth
- Hardoy, Inés
- Røed, Knut
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2013