Technology Choice and Incentives under Relative Performance Schemes

Konferenzbeitrag

We identify a new problem that may arise when heterogeneous workers are motivated by relative performance schemes: If workers' abilities and the production technology are complements, the firm may prefer not to adopt a more advanced technology even though this technology would costlessly increase each worker's productivity. Due to the complementarity between ability and technology, under technology adoption the productivity of a more able worker increases more strongly than the productivity of a less able colleague, thereby reducing the motivation of both workers to exert effort under a relative incentive scheme. We show that this adverse incentive effect is dominant and, consequently, keeps the firm from introducing a better production technology if talent uncertainty is sufficiently high and/or monitoring of workers is sufficiently precise.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Principal Agent Problems ; No. G15-V3

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Personnel Economics: Labor Contracting Devices ; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Thema: complementarities ; heterogeneous workers ; production technology ; tournament

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Schöttner, Anja ; Kräkel, Matthias
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Verein für Socialpolitik
• (wo): Frankfurt a. M.
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37191
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ