Arbeitspapier
Venture Capitalists Investment Incentives Under Public Equity Schemes
This paper analyses the impact of public equity schemes on venture capitalist's incentives to finance start-up enterprises and to support the management teams. In a double-sided moral hazard model, it is shown that experienced venture capitalists, who have already financed start-up enterprises, reduce their intensity of management support under public equity schemes. However, public equity offers inexperienced venture capitalists, who have not yet financed start-up enterprises because of insuf-ficient experience, incentives to enter the venture capital market so that they can start to accumulate experience.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 1117
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
Double-sided moral hazard
public equity
venture capital
Risikokapital
Öffentliche Kapitalbeteiligung
Subvention
Unternehmensgründung
Finanzierungstheorie
Moral Hazard
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Schertler, Andrea
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Kiel Institute for World Economics (IfW)
- (wo)
-
Kiel
- (wann)
-
2002
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Schertler, Andrea
- Kiel Institute for World Economics (IfW)
Entstanden
- 2002