Venture Capitalists Investment Incentives Under Public Equity Schemes

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyses the impact of public equity schemes on venture capitalist's incentives to finance start-up enterprises and to support the management teams. In a double-sided moral hazard model, it is shown that experienced venture capitalists, who have already financed start-up enterprises, reduce their intensity of management support under public equity schemes. However, public equity offers inexperienced venture capitalists, who have not yet financed start-up enterprises because of insuf-ficient experience, incentives to enter the venture capital market so that they can start to accumulate experience.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 1117

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks ; Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation ; Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: Double-sided moral hazard ; public equity ; venture capital ; Risikokapital ; Öffentliche Kapitalbeteiligung ; Subvention ; Unternehmensgründung ; Finanzierungstheorie ; Moral Hazard ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Schertler, Andrea
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Kiel Institute for World Economics (IfW)
• (where): Kiel
• (when): 2002

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/17781
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:28 AM CET