Arbeitspapier
Choice over Payment Schemes and Worker Effort
We study the effect of monetary incentives on effort in a prosocial task: writing letters encouraging voter turnout. Volunteers are randomized to receive no incentive, unconditional upfront payment, payment conditional on completing the task, or to have a choice between the two payment schemes. The unconditional and conditional payment both increase task completion rates by about 18 percentage points (43%). Giving people a choice between the payment scheme doubles the effect on task completion (35 p.p., 84%). Unlike unconditional payments, a choice over contracts also increases time spent on the task and letter quality. Survey responses suggest that giving people a choice is effective because it increases task ownership rather than the desire to return a favor or avoid feelings of guilt.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 15769
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Economics of Contract: Theory
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
- Thema
-
self determination
gift exchange
guilt aversion
labor supply
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Abel, Martin
Burger, Rulof
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2022
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Abel, Martin
- Burger, Rulof
- Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2022
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