Arbeitspapier
Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?
We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the almost-plurality, the almost-inverse-plurality, and the almost-Borda rule can be optimal. Which of the "almost" rules is optimal depends on the likelihood that a candidate has high ability and how likely committee members are to correctly identify the abilities of the different candidates.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 11287
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Subject
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committee decisions
scoring rules
"almost" voting rules
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Baharad, Eyal
Danziger, Leif
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- (where)
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Bonn
- (when)
-
2018
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Baharad, Eyal
- Danziger, Leif
- Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2018
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An international comparison of voting by committees
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First and Second Best Voting Rules in Committees
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Hiring Discrimination: An Overview of (Almost) All Correspondence Experiments Since 2005
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