Artikel

Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games

We characterize a class of dynamic stochastic games that we call separable dynamic games with noisy transitions and establish that these widely used models are protocol invariant provided that periods are sufficiently short. Protocol invariance means that the set of Markov perfect equilibria is nearly the same irrespective of the order in which players are assumed to move within a period. Protocol invariance can facilitate applied work and renders the implications and predictions of a model more robust. Our class of dynamic stochastic games includes investment games, R\&D races, models of industry dynamics, dynamic public contribution games, asynchronously repeated games, and many other models from the extant literature.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 14 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 597-646 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Dynamic stochastic games
timing of decisions
commitment
protocol invariance

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Doraszelski, Ulrich
Escobar, Juan F.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New Haven, CT
(wann)
2019

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE3230
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Doraszelski, Ulrich
  • Escobar, Juan F.
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2019

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