Arbeitspapier
On the Composition of Committees
This paper is concerned with the role of committees in collective decision-makingprocesses in a world where agents must be motivated to collect information. Committees improvethe quality of decision-making by providing information and by coordinating the collection ofinformation. We address two types of questions. First, how does the composition of a committeeaffect final decisions? Second, what is the optimal composition of a committee from thedecision maker's point of view? As to the latter question, we show that the cost of informationcollection plays an important role. If this cost is low, then the preferences of the committeemembers should be aligned to those of the decision maker. Members with similar preferences asthe decision maker collect the proper pieces of information. Moreover, manipulation ofinformation does not occur if the preferences of the decision maker and the members areconsonant. If the cost of searching is high, then the committee should be composed ofmembers with polarized preferences. Outliers have a strong incentive to search for information.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 03-006/1
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Subject
-
committees
information collection
preference outliers
moderates.
Entscheidung
Informationsversorgung
Informationsverhalten
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Beniers, Klaas J.
Swank, Otto H.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2003
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Beniers, Klaas J.
- Swank, Otto H.
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2003
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