Arbeitspapier

On the Optimal Composition of Committees

This paper derives a simple characterization of how to optimally divide an organization’s experts into different decision-making committees. The focus is on many three-member committees that make decisions by a simple majority rule. We find that the allocation of experts to committees is optimal if and only if it minimizes the sum of the products of the experts’ skills in each committee. As a result, given the experts of any two committees, the product of the experts’ skills should be as similar as possible in the two committees, and it is never optimal to have the three worst experts in one committee and the three best experts in another.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4685

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Thema
optimal composition of committees
simple majority rule

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ben-Yashar, Ruth
Danziger, Leif
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ben-Yashar, Ruth
  • Danziger, Leif
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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