Arbeitspapier

On the Endogenous Choice of Bertrand Vs. Cournot Equilibrium in a Duopoly

We try to endogenise the choice between Bertrand Equilibrium (BE) and Cournot Equilibrium (CE) in simple duopoly models. The two distinctive features of this paper as compared to the related literature are the following. First, we take the concepts of BE an CE as fundamental and restict players' choices to these two equilibria. Second, we adopt a forward induction criterion to shrink the Nash equilibrium set of our games. Our findings suggest the BE seems more vulnerable than the CE whenever forward induction is taken seriously.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 91

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Delbono, Flavio
Mariotti, Marco
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(where)
Bologna
(when)
1990

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5274
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Delbono, Flavio
  • Mariotti, Marco
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Time of origin

  • 1990

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