- Sprache
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Englisch
- Identifier
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1192002415
- Reihe
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Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008); 99-75
Thema
Wettbewerb ; Auktionstheorie ; Kostenfunktion ; Allokation ; Effizienz
Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
- URN
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
26.01.2023, 13:57 MEZ
Objekttyp
- Monografie
Beteiligte
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