Arbeitspapier

Does higher tax morale imply higher optimal labor income tax rate?

We analyze the impact of tax morale on the optimal progressive labor income taxation. Only universal basic income is financed from a linear tax and the financing of public goods is neglected. Each individual supplies labor and (un)declares earning, depending on his labor disutility and tax morale. Limiting the utilitarianism to the poorer parts of the population (defined by the inclusion share), the optimal tax rate is an increasing function of the tax morale and a decreasing function of the inclusion share, provide that the average wage of the included is higher than 0.54 times the average wage.

ISBN
978-615-5243-12-7
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2012/18

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Public Goods
Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
Thema
tax morale
progressive income tax
undeclared earning
labor supply
income redistribution
Steuermoral
Wirkungsanalyse
Einkommensteuer
Optimale Besteuerung
Steuerprogression
Arbeitsangebot

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Simonovits, András
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies
(wo)
Budapest
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Simonovits, András
  • Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies

Entstanden

  • 2012

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