Arbeitspapier

Nice guys finish last: Are people with higher tax morale taxed more heavily?

This paper is the first to provide evidence of efficient taxation of groups with heterogeneous levels of 'tax morale'. We set up an optimal income tax model where high tax morale implies a high subjective cost of evading taxes. The model predicts that 'nice guys finish last': groups with higher tax morale will be taxed more heavily, simply because taxing them is less costly. Based on unique cross-country micro data and an IV approach to rule out reverse causality, we find empirical support for this hypothesis. Income groups with high tax morale systematically face higher average and marginal tax rates.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 6275

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
tax morale
tax compliance
optimal taxation
political economy
Steuermoral
Steuerbelastung
Optimale Besteuerung
Public Choice
Schätzung
Welt

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Doerrenberg, Philipp
Duncan, Denvil
Fuest, Clemens
Peichl, Andreas
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2012

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-201203064057
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Doerrenberg, Philipp
  • Duncan, Denvil
  • Fuest, Clemens
  • Peichl, Andreas
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2012

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