Arbeitspapier

Team governance: empowerment or hierarchical control

We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members, interventions that the manager undertakes in order to assure certain efforts may have destructive effects: they can distort the way workers perceive their fellow workers and they may also lead to a reduction of effort by those workers that care most about output. Moreover, interventions may hinder the development of a cooperative organizational culture in which workers trust each other. Thus, our framework provides some first insights into the costs and benefits of interventions in teams. It identifies that team governance is driven by the importance of tasks that cannot be monitored. The more important these tasks, the more likely it is that teams are empowered.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3143

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Team work
incentives
informed principal
intrinsic motivation
Gruppenarbeit
Leistungsmotivation
Agency Theory
Leistungskontrolle
Leistungsanreiz
Vertrauen
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Friebel, Guido
Schnedler, Wendelin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Friebel, Guido
  • Schnedler, Wendelin
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2007

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