Artikel

Overtime Work as a Signaling Device

This paper provides an explanation for the empirically proven relationship between overtime and future benefits. We suggest an internal signaling model, in which a worker signals his value to the employer by supplying unpaid overtime. In our empirical analysis, we examine whether overtime has in fact a signaling component. Variations in collectively bargained hours between industries are exploited, as they imply different overtime thresholds for workers with the same number of actual hours. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study for the years 1993–2004, a positive signaling value of unpaid overtime is found for West German workers.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Scottish Journal of Political Economy ; ISSN: 1467-9485 ; Volume: 55 ; Year: 2008 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 167-189 ; Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Labor Contracts
Thema
Unpaid Overtime
Internal Signaling
Asymmetric Information
Arbeit
Arbeitszeit
Lohn
Alte Bundesländer

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Anger, Silke
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
John Wiley & Sons
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
(wo)
Hoboken, NJ
(wann)
2008-05

DOI
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9485.2008.00449.x
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Anger, Silke
  • John Wiley & Sons
  • ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft

Entstanden

  • 2008-05

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