Voting as a Signaling Device

Arbeitspapier

In this paper, citizens vote in order to influence the election outcome and in order to signal their unobserved characteristics to others. The model is one of rational voting and generates the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not voting does not arise, because the benefi t of voting does not vanish with population size. (ii) Turnout in elections is positively related to the size of the local community and the importance of social interactions. (iii) Voting may exhibit bandwagon effects and small changes in the electoral incentives may generate large changes in turnout due to signaling effects. (iv) Signaling incentives increase the sensitivity of turnout to voting incentives in communities with low opportunity cost of social interaction, while the opposite is true for communities with high cost of social interaction. Therefore, the model predicts less volatile turnout for the latter type of communities.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 108

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
• Thema: electoral incentives ; signaling ; voting

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Aytimur, R. Emre ; Boukouras, Aristotelis ; Schwager, Robert
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Courant Research Centre - Poverty, Equity and Growth (CRC-PEG)
• (wo): Göttingen
• (wann): 2012

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/90558
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ