Artikel

Financial contracts as coordination device

We study the use of financial contracts as bid-coordinating device in multi-unit uniform price auctions. Coordination is required whenever firms face a volunteer's dilemma in pricing strategies: one firm (the “volunteer") is needed to increase the market clearing price. Volunteering, however, is costly, as inframarginal suppliers sell their entire capacity whereas the volunteer only sells residual demand. We identify conditions under which signing financial contracts solves this dilemma. We test our framework exploiting data on contract positions by large producers in the New York power market. Using a Monte Carlo simulation, we show that the contracting strategy is payoff dominant and provide estimates of the benefits of such strategy.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy ; ISSN: 1530-9134 ; Volume: 29 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 241-259 ; Hoboken, NJ: Wiley

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
auctions
coordination
electricity
forward markets
volunteer's dilemma

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Le Coq, Chloé
Schwenen, Sebastian
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Wiley
(wo)
Hoboken, NJ
(wann)
2020

DOI
doi:10.1111/jems.12340
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Le Coq, Chloé
  • Schwenen, Sebastian
  • Wiley

Entstanden

  • 2020

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