Konferenzbeitrag
The Dark Side of the Force: Evolutionary Equilibrium in Contests with Stochastic Entry
We study evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in contests where participation is stochastic. When participation probabilities are given, players exert more effort In ESS than under Nash. Ex-ante overdissipation occurs when participation is suff. likely and discriminative power of the contest suff. high. When entry is costly and endogenous, players’ entry is more likely, more costly, and less profitable in ESS than under Nash. Ex-ante overdissipation also occurs for concave impact functions.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Economic Theory ; No. C03-V1
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Gu, Yiquan
Hehenkamp, Burkhard
Leininger, Wolfgang
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- (where)
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Kiel, Hamburg
- (when)
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2017
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Konferenzbeitrag
Associated
- Gu, Yiquan
- Hehenkamp, Burkhard
- Leininger, Wolfgang
- ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Time of origin
- 2017