Konferenzbeitrag

The Dark Side of the Force: Evolutionary Equilibrium in Contests with Stochastic Entry

We study evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in contests where participation is stochastic. When participation probabilities are given, players exert more effort In ESS than under Nash. Ex-ante overdissipation occurs when participation is suff. likely and discriminative power of the contest suff. high. When entry is costly and endogenous, players’ entry is more likely, more costly, and less profitable in ESS than under Nash. Ex-ante overdissipation also occurs for concave impact functions.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Economic Theory ; No. C03-V1

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Gu, Yiquan
Hehenkamp, Burkhard
Leininger, Wolfgang
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
(where)
Kiel, Hamburg
(when)
2017

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Associated

  • Gu, Yiquan
  • Hehenkamp, Burkhard
  • Leininger, Wolfgang
  • ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft

Time of origin

  • 2017

Other Objects (12)