Contests over Public Goods: Evolutionary Stability and the Free-Rider Problem

Arbeitspapier

We analyze group contests for public goods by applying the solution concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). We show that a global ESS cannot exist, because a mutant free-rider can always invade group behavior successfully. There does exist, however, a unique local ESS, which we identify with evolutionary equilibrium. It coincides with Nash equilibrium, the hitherto dominant solution concept in contest theory, if and only if groups are symmetric. For asymmetric groups it always proposes a different and arguably more sensible solution than Nash equilibrium. We explore the properties of (local) ESS in detail.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 713

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: contests ; public goods ; evolutionary stability.

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Leininger, Wolfgang
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2002

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75922
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ