Arbeitspapier
Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests
We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 331
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Noncooperative Games
- Subject
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contest
imperfectly discriminating
asymmetric information
equilibrium existence
interdependent values
Wettbewerb
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Asymmetrische Information
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Wasser, Cédric
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (where)
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München
- (when)
-
2010
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13223
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13223-8
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Wasser, Cédric
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Time of origin
- 2010