Arbeitspapier

Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests

We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 331

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Noncooperative Games
Subject
contest
imperfectly discriminating
asymmetric information
equilibrium existence
interdependent values
Wettbewerb
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Asymmetrische Information
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Wasser, Cédric
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(where)
München
(when)
2010

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13223
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13223-8
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Wasser, Cédric
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Time of origin

  • 2010

Other Objects (12)