Envy and Compassion in Tournaments

Arbeitspapier

Many experiments indicate that most individuals are not purely motivated by material self interest, but also care about the well being of others. In this paper we examine tournaments among inequity averse agents, who dislike disadvantageous inequity (envy) and advantageous inequity (compassion). It turns out that inequity averse agents exert higher effort levels than purely self-interested agents for a given prize structure. Contrary to standard tournament theory first-best efforts can not be implemented when prizes are endogenous. Several extensions are studied like the case of spiteful agents, sabotage, asymmetric agents and an application on the choice between vertical and lateral promotions within firms.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 647

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects ; Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
• Subject: tournaments ; promotions ; inequity aversion ; Erwerbsverlauf ; Wettbewerb ; Spieltheorie ; Leistungsmotivation ; Gerechtigkeit ; Theorie ; Tournament ; inequity aversion

Contributors, Location and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Grund, Christian ; Sliwka, Dirk
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2002

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20846
• Last update: 20.09.2024, 8:22 AM CEST