Arbeitspapier

Runoff vs. plurality: Does it matter for expenditures? : Evidence from Italy

This paper compares the runoff system and the plurality rule in terms of the size and composition of public expenditures. I use the change in the voting rule in Italian municipalities at 15,000 residents to implement a regression discontinuity design. The results show that municipalities under the runoff system spend at least 20 percent more than those under the plurality rule, and that this effect is primarily driven by a large increase in administrative spending. Additionally, the greater number of candidates and the larger coalitions indicate lower accountability under the runoff system than under the plurality rule.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2018:13

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Institutions and the Macroeconomy
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Other
Subject
Voting rules
Fiscal policy
Runoff
Plurality
Regression discontinuity design

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Cipullo, Davide
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Uppsala University, Department of Economics
(where)
Uppsala
(when)
2018

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-363444
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Cipullo, Davide
  • Uppsala University, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2018

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