Arbeitspapier
Moderating political extremism: single round vs runoff elections under plurality rule
We compare single ballot vs dual ballot elections under plurality rule, assuming sincere voting and allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under the dual ballot, the number of parties is larger but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy is smaller, because their bargaining power is reduced compared to a single ballot election. The predictions on the number of parties and on policy volatility are consistent with data on municipal elections in Italy, where cities with more (less) than 15,000 inhabitants have dual (single) ballots respectively.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2600
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- Thema
-
Run-off
municipal elections
political bargaining
property
Wahl
Abstimmungsregel
Wahlverhalten
Radikalismus
Verhandlungen
Theorie
Kommunalwahl
Italien
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bordignon, Massimo
Tabellini, Guido
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bordignon, Massimo
- Tabellini, Guido
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2009
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