Arbeitspapier
Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule
We compare single round vs runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy and hence policy volatility are smaller, because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced compared to single round elections. The predictions on the number of candidates and on policy volatility are confirmed by evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Italy, where cities above 15,000 inhabitants elect the mayor with a runoff system, while those below hold single round elections.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7561
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
State and Local Budget and Expenditures
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
- Thema
-
electoral rules
policy volatility
regression discontinuity design
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bordignon, Massimo
Nannicini, Tommaso
Tabellini, Guido
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bordignon, Massimo
- Nannicini, Tommaso
- Tabellini, Guido
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2013
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