Households, Markets and Public Choice

Arbeitspapier

We develop a model that combines competitive exchange of private commodities across endogenously formed groups with public good provision and global collective decisions. There is a tension between local and global collective decisions. In particular, we show that group formation and collective decisions on public goods may destabilize each other, even if there exist favorable conditions for matching on the one hand, and for global collective decisions on the other hand. We establish sufficient conditions for the existence of competitive equilibria with endogenous household formation and public choice.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4947

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Household Behavior: General ; Exchange and Production Economies ; Externalities ; Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General ; Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General ; Public Goods
• Subject: household formation ; matching ; general equilibrium ; public goods ; public choice ; median voter theorem

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Gersbach, Hans ; Haller, Hans
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2014

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/102236
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET