Arbeitspapier

Selection wages and discrimination

Applicants for any given job are more or less suited to fill it, and the firm will select the best among them. Increasing the wage offer attracts more applicants and makes it possible to raise the hiring standard and improve the productivity of the staff. Wages that optimize on the trade-off between the wage level and the productivity of the workforce are known as selection wages. As men react more strongly to wage differ¬entials than females, the trade-off is more pronounced for men and a profitmaximizing firm will offer a higher wage for men than for women in equilibrium.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 2009-35

Classification
Wirtschaft
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Feminist Economics
Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Subject
Discrimination
selection wages
efficiency wages
hiring standards
monopsony
employment criteria
wage posting
Reder competition
Arbeitsnachfrage
Lohnstruktur
Lohndifferenzierung
Effizienzlohn
Monopson
Männer
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Schlicht, Ekkehart
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
(where)
Kiel
(when)
2009

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Schlicht, Ekkehart
  • Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)

Time of origin

  • 2009

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