Artikel
Selection wages and discrimination
Applicants for any given job are more or less suited to fill it, and the firm will select the best among them. Increasing the wage offer attracts more applicants and makes it possible to raise the hiring standard, thereby improving the productivity of the staff. Wages that optimize on the trade-off between the wage level and the productivity of the workforce are known as selection wages. As men react more strongly to wage differentials than females, the trade-off is more pronounced for men and a profit-maximizing firm will offer a higher wage for men than for women in equilibrium. The argument is not confined to issues of sex discrimination; rather it is of relevance for all labor markets where labor heterogeneity is important and supply elasticities vary systematically across occupations.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal ; ISSN: 1864-6042 ; Volume: 4 ; Year: 2010 ; Issue: 2010-6 ; Pages: 1-30 ; Kiel: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Feminist Economics
Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
- Thema
-
Discrimination
sex discrimination
occupational discrimination
regional discrimination
selection wages
efficiency wages
hiring standards
monopsony
employment criteria
wage posting
Reder competition
wage structure
inter-industry wage structure
employer size-wage effect
occupational wage structure
Arbeitsnachfrage
Lohnstruktur
Lohndifferenzierung
Effizienzlohn
Monopson
Männer
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Schlicht, Ekkehart
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- (wo)
-
Kiel
- (wann)
-
2010
- DOI
-
doi:10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2010-6
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Schlicht, Ekkehart
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Entstanden
- 2010
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