Arbeitspapier
Lying and team incentives
We investigate the influence of two widespread compensation schemes, individual piece-rates and team incentives, on participants' inclination to lie, by adapting the experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a so far fairly neglected feature of these compensation schemes.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 5968
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- Subject
-
compensation schemes
lying
team
experiment
Arbeitsgruppe
Vergütungssystem
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Kommunikation
Test
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Conrads, Julian
Irlenbusch, Bernd
Rilke, Rainer Michael
Walkowitz, Gari
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2011
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-201110102151
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Conrads, Julian
- Irlenbusch, Bernd
- Rilke, Rainer Michael
- Walkowitz, Gari
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2011
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Team incentives and leadership
Lying and Reciprocity
Lying to Individuals versus Lying to Groups
Team Incentives, Task Assignment, and Performance: A Field Experiment
Helping under a Combination of Team and Tournament Incentives
Team Incentives and Performance: Evidence from a Retail Chain
Collective Incentives and Cooperation in Teams with Imperfect Monitoring
Team Incentives, Task Assignment, and Performance: A Field Experiment
Team Incentives, Social Cohesion, and Performance: A Natural Field Experiment