Arbeitspapier

Lying and team incentives

We investigate the influence of two widespread compensation schemes, individual piece-rates and team incentives, on participants' inclination to lie, by adapting the experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a so far fairly neglected feature of these compensation schemes.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 5968

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Subject
compensation schemes
lying
team
experiment
Arbeitsgruppe
Vergütungssystem
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Kommunikation
Test

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Conrads, Julian
Irlenbusch, Bernd
Rilke, Rainer Michael
Walkowitz, Gari
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2011

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-201110102151
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Conrads, Julian
  • Irlenbusch, Bernd
  • Rilke, Rainer Michael
  • Walkowitz, Gari
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2011

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