Arbeitspapier
Lying and team incentives
We investigate the influence of two widespread compensation schemes, individual piece-rates and team incentives, on participants' inclination to lie, by adapting the experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a so far fairly neglected feature of these compensation schemes.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 5968
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- Subject
-
compensation schemes
lying
team
experiment
Arbeitsgruppe
Vergütungssystem
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Kommunikation
Test
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Conrads, Julian
Irlenbusch, Bernd
Rilke, Rainer Michael
Walkowitz, Gari
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2011
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-201110102151
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Conrads, Julian
- Irlenbusch, Bernd
- Rilke, Rainer Michael
- Walkowitz, Gari
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2011