Job search with bidder memories

Arbeitspapier

This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker. When a worker first meets a firm, the firm offers the worker a sufficient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the future. The pair share the gains to trade. In this case, the Diamond paradox no longer holds.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 4319

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity ; Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets ; Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
• Thema: Job search ; recall ; wage determination ; Diamond paradox ; Arbeitsuche ; Arbeitsnachfrage ; Auktionstheorie ; Informationsverhalten ; Lohnbildung ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos ; Menzio, Guido ; Smith, Eric
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36185
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-20090825586
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ