Arbeitspapier

Bidder preferences among auction institutions

This study examines bidder preferences between alternative auction institutions. In particular we seek to experimentally characterize the degree to which bidders prefer an ascending auction over a sealed bid auction. We find very strong ceteris paribus preferences for the ascending institution with bidders choosing it overwhelmingly often when entry prices for the two auctions are the same. When the entry prices of the two auctions differ, many subjects can be shown to be willing to pay far more to enter the ascending auction than is explainable by their risk attitudes when accounting for their expectations about the risk preferences of their opponents.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 2002,86

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Auctions
Subject
bidder preferences
private values
sealed bid auctions
ascending auctions

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
Salmon, Tim
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2002

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10049650
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
  • Salmon, Tim
  • Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes

Time of origin

  • 2002

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