- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
1 Online-Ressource.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Auction design and order of sale with budget-constrained bidders ; day:10 ; month:10 ; year:2023 ; pages:1-22
Experimental economics ; (10.10.2023), 1-22
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Urheber
-
Bergmann, Ulrich
Konovalov, Arkady
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
-
10.1007/s10683-023-09812-y
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2023123021030013822474
- Rechteinformation
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
15.08.2025, 07:34 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Beteiligte
- Bergmann, Ulrich
- Konovalov, Arkady
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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