Arbeitspapier
Strategic Hiring Behavior in Empirical Matching Functions
This paper makes two contributions to the empirical matching literature. First, a recent study by Anderson and Burgess (2000) testing for endogenous competition among job seekers in a matching frame-work, is replicated with a richer and more accurate data set for Germany. Their results are confirmed and found to be surprisingly robust. Second, the matching framework is augmented by endogenous strategic hiring behavior on the side of vacancyposting firms. Neglecting job competition, the relevance of strategic hiring is shown using the same empirical strategy. At the same time, the test is shown to be invalid if both types of endogenous behavior are present
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 320
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Labor Contracts
- Thema
-
Matching models
job search
vacancies
unemployment
job competition
strategic hiring
Arbeitsnachfrage
Strategie
Arbeitsuche
Wettbewerb
Arbeitsmarkt
Matching
Schätzung
Deutschland
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fahr, René
Sunde, Uwe
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fahr, René
- Sunde, Uwe
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2001