Arbeitspapier

Potential, prizes and performance : testing tournament theory with professional tennis data

This paper tests two hypotheses from the theory of elimination tournaments: (i) that uneven tournaments, where the contestants are ex ante heterogeneous, entail lower effort exertion; this is a prediction from agency theory that has not been tested empirically before; and (ii) whether incentives set through prizes matter for effort exertion; this assumption underlies any agency theory about elimination tournaments, and has been empirically tested in other contexts. The evidence obtained with data from professional tennis tournaments supports both the assumption that incentives matter, as well as the theoretical implications concerning uneven tournaments among heterogeneous contestants.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 947

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Labor Contracts
Thema
elimination tournaments
uneven tournaments
incentives in tournaments
tennis
Leistungsmotivation
Wettbewerb
Leistungsanreiz
Agency Theory
Schätzung
Theorie
Welt
Tournament

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Sunde, Uwe
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2003

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:25 MESZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Sunde, Uwe
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2003

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