Arbeitspapier
Inter-generational thoughtfulness in a dynamic public good experiment
In a laboratory experiment we investigate inter-generational concerns and myopia in a dynamic Public Good game. Groups of four played a 15-period game where they could either invest in a green sector or in a more profitable brown sector that builds a pollution stock. We find that subjects are more cooperative when their final pollution stock will be inherited by another group in a later session. Furthermore, we observe that defection from a negotiated common plan is higher when subjects are in a loss frame, negotiated plans are more ambitious. We analyze our results in reference to several social preference theories and find that Linear Altruism is most supported in such a dynamic environment.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 383
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Public Goods
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
- Thema
-
Dynamic
Environmental Economics
Experimental Economics
Inter-Generation
Public Good
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Spiller, Jörg
Bolle, Friedel
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
European University Viadrina, Department of Business Administration and Economics
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt (Oder)
- (wann)
-
2016
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Spiller, Jörg
- Bolle, Friedel
- European University Viadrina, Department of Business Administration and Economics
Entstanden
- 2016