Arbeitspapier

Inter-generational thoughtfulness in a dynamic public good experiment

In a laboratory experiment we investigate inter-generational concerns and myopia in a dynamic Public Good game. Groups of four played a 15-period game where they could either invest in a green sector or in a more profitable brown sector that builds a pollution stock. We find that subjects are more cooperative when their final pollution stock will be inherited by another group in a later session. Furthermore, we observe that defection from a negotiated common plan is higher when subjects are in a loss frame, negotiated plans are more ambitious. We analyze our results in reference to several social preference theories and find that Linear Altruism is most supported in such a dynamic environment.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 383

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Public Goods
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Thema
Dynamic
Environmental Economics
Experimental Economics
Inter-Generation
Public Good

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Spiller, Jörg
Bolle, Friedel
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
European University Viadrina, Department of Business Administration and Economics
(wo)
Frankfurt (Oder)
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Spiller, Jörg
  • Bolle, Friedel
  • European University Viadrina, Department of Business Administration and Economics

Entstanden

  • 2016

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