Arbeitspapier
Intra-generational externalities and inter-generational transfers
In an environment with asymmetric information the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves-Vickrey (D?Aspremont-Gérard-Varet) mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can generally be covered in every generation if the growth rate of the economy is positive. This result yields an alternative explanation for the existence of pay-as-you-go financed transfer mechanisms.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1437
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Social Security and Public Pensions
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
pay-as-you-go
externalities
mechanism design
adverse selection
Umlageverfahren
Privater Transfer
Externer Effekt
Generationenbeziehungen
Adverse Selection
Asymmetrische Information
Pareto-Optimum
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kolmar, Martin
Meier, Volker
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kolmar, Martin
- Meier, Volker
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2005