Intra-generational externalities and inter-generational transfers

Arbeitspapier

In an environment with asymmetric information the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves-Vickrey (D?Aspremont-Gérard-Varet) mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can generally be covered in every generation if the growth rate of the economy is positive. This result yields an alternative explanation for the existence of pay-as-you-go financed transfer mechanisms.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1437

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Social Security and Public Pensions ; Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: pay-as-you-go ; externalities ; mechanism design ; adverse selection ; Umlageverfahren ; Privater Transfer ; Externer Effekt ; Generationenbeziehungen ; Adverse Selection ; Asymmetrische Information ; Pareto-Optimum ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kolmar, Martin ; Meier, Volker
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2005

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18801
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET