Family job search, wage bargainings, and optimal unemployment insurance

Arbeitspapier

The paper develops an equilibrium search and matching model where two-person families as well as singles participate in the labor market. We show that equilibrium entails wage dispersion among equally productive risk-averse workers. Marital status as well as spousal labor market status matter for wage outcomes. In general, employed members of two-person families receive higher wages than employed singles. The model is applied to a welfare analysis of alternative unemployment insurance systems, recognizing the role of spousal employment as a partial substitute for public insurance. The optimal system involves benefit differentiation based on marital status as well as spousal labor market status. Optimal differentiation yields small welfare gains but gives rise to large wage differentials.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2920

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials ; Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search ; Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
• Subject: job search ; wage bargaining ; wage differentials ; unemployment ; unemployment insurance ; Arbeitsplatzsuchmodell ; Lohnverhandlungen ; Lohndifferenzierung ; Arbeitslosenversicherung ; Familie ; Ehe ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Ek, Susanne ; Holmlund, Bertil
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30743
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET