Arbeitspapier
Labor force participation, job search effort and unemployment insurance in the laboratory
How the provision of unemployment benefits affects employment and unemployment is a debated issue. In this paper, we aim at complementing theoretical and empirical contributions to this debate with a laboratory experiment: We simulate a job market with search effort and labor force participation decisions while varying the maximum length of unemployment benefit eligibility. Our results reveal two separable, opposing effects: Individuals within the labor force search with lower effort when unemployment benefits are extended. However, individuals are more likely to participate in the labor force and to actively search for a job. Concerning employment, the second effect dominates so that unemployment benefits raise employment.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 2149
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Macro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
- Thema
-
Job Search
Employment
Labor Force Participation
Unemployment Insurance
Economic Recession
Laboratory
Experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lechthaler, Wolfgang
Ring, Patrick
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- (wo)
-
Kiel
- (wann)
-
2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lechthaler, Wolfgang
- Ring, Patrick
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Entstanden
- 2020