Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Search Equilibrium

Arbeitspapier

Should unemployment compensation be paid indefinitely at a fixed rate or should it decline (or increase) over a worker’s unemployment spell? We examine these issues using an equilibrium model of search unemployment. The model features worker-firm bargaining over wages, free entry of new jobs, and endogenous search effort among the unemployed. The main result is that an optimal insurance program implies a declining sequence of unemployment compensation over the spell of unemployment. Numerical calibrations of the model suggest that there are non-trivial welfare gains associated with switching from an optimal uniform benefit structure to an optimally differentiated system.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 1998:2

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
• Thema: Job search ; Unemployment ; Unemployment insurance

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Fredriksson, Peter ; Holmlund, Bertil
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Uppsala University, Department of Economics
• (wo): Uppsala
• (wann): 1998

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/82887
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ