Arbeitspapier

Market transparency and consumer search - Evidence from the German retail gasoline market

We study a novel trade-off in market transparency regulation by estimating a structural model of the German retail gasoline market. Transparent environments enable easy price comparisons and match findings. Restricting transparency such that only the cheapest offers are shown induces firms to compete for attention, but matching is inefficient. We find that there is an inverse u-shaped relationship between consumer welfare and market transparency. Consumer welfare is maximal when only the first 20% of prices are shown, which decreases consumer expenditures by 1.2%. Our framework allows estimating games of incomplete information with very lax data requirement.

ISBN
978-3-86304-349-0
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 350

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Regulation and Industrial Policy: General
Thema
market transparency
consumer search
awareness
consideration sets
retail gasoline prices

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Martin, Simon
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
(wo)
Düsseldorf
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Martin, Simon
  • Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Entstanden

  • 2020

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