Arbeitspapier
Market transparency and consumer search - Evidence from the German retail gasoline market
We study a novel trade-off in market transparency regulation by estimating a structural model of the German retail gasoline market. Transparent environments enable easy price comparisons and match findings. Restricting transparency such that only the cheapest offers are shown induces firms to compete for attention, but matching is inefficient. We find that there is an inverse u-shaped relationship between consumer welfare and market transparency. Consumer welfare is maximal when only the first 20% of prices are shown, which decreases consumer expenditures by 1.2%. Our framework allows estimating games of incomplete information with very lax data requirement.
- ISBN
-
978-3-86304-349-0
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 350
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Regulation and Industrial Policy: General
- Thema
-
market transparency
consumer search
awareness
consideration sets
retail gasoline prices
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Martin, Simon
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
- (wo)
-
Düsseldorf
- (wann)
-
2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Martin, Simon
- Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Entstanden
- 2020