Arbeitspapier

Competition and coordination in the Mexican retail market for gasoline

We document the following stylized facts for the Mexican retail market for gasoline using data for 2018-2019: (1) consumer prices adjust slower than wholesale prices; (2) more competition, in the form of a higher density of stations, implies lower markups and lower prices; and (3) more competition implies faster pass-through. However, we find geographical differences in the speed of pass-through that cannot be explained by differences in station density. We conjecture that coordination on high prices could be offsetting competitive pressure in some locations. We build a classifier that separates municipalities into two categories depending on whether the relative price concentration is on "high" prices or "low" prices. In the first type of municipalities, the price concentration is correlated positively with the price level and negatively with pass-through. For concentration in "low" prices the signs of the correlations are reversed.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Papers ; No. 2020-15

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Thema
Gasoline
Pass-through
Geographic Competition
Price Coordination

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Contreras-Astiazaran, Benjamin
Vizcaíno, René Leal
Mosqueda, Jordán
Salcedo, Alejandrina
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Banco de México
(wo)
Ciudad de México
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Contreras-Astiazaran, Benjamin
  • Vizcaíno, René Leal
  • Mosqueda, Jordán
  • Salcedo, Alejandrina
  • Banco de México

Entstanden

  • 2020

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